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International taxation is one of the most important but least studied
topics in all of tax; indeed, it may be one of the most undeservedly
ignored topics in all of law. Combined, U.S. imports and exports now
equal roughly 20% of U.S. gross domestic product. 1 For most
countries, the figure is even higher: about 45% for Germany and the
United Kingdom, 65% for Mexico, and 70% for Canada. 2 KPMG,
which employs some of the symposium authors, counts more tax
lawyers in its international tax division than in its domestic tax division.
Nevertheless, only half of U.S. law schools regularly offer even one
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1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE (ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN.), STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 451 (120th ed. 2000).

2. Id. at 831,853.
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course on the subject. 3 Most U.S. tax policy analysis assumes a closed
universe-that is, a U.S. tax system without boundaries.
One of the reasons the topic is so important in the real world and
yet so little loved of scholars is that international tax law is both
excruciatingly complex and fundamentally arbitrary. The U.S. rules
resemble sedimentary rock-accreting over time, pocked with fossils,
and with little structure to aid in understanding. Scholars make their
reputations by rationalizing complexity. International tax seems, on its
face, to offer little opportunity for productive theorizing. Yet it is this
very lack of theoretical foundation that makes the rules so practically
important. Our individual tax rules, particularly as to income from
goods and services, have been polished to a high sheen against the ideal
of a comprehensive tax base, our corporate rules against the ideal of
double taxation. As a result, purely domestic taxpayers can often safely
live their lives and run their businesses without consulting tax advisors
until it comes time to file returns. By contrast, the international tax
rules are full of traps for the unwary and opportunities for the welladvised-a context in which practitioners routinely add substantial
value and receive commensurate return.
One of the principal reasons for this irrationality is simple: there is
as of yet no consensus as to how the tax base represented by the world
economy should be shared among the world's roughly 200 nations.
Currently, for the most part, each government decides unilaterally what
portion of that base to claim. As a result, some parts of the world
economy are taxed once, some twice, some many times, and some not at
all. The United States attempts to resolve some of the resulting
problems by treaty, but (1) we lack treaties with many important trading
partners, 4 (2) treaties merely limit taxation, they do not address
problems of otherwise untaxed income, and (3) all of our tax treaties are
bilateral and unique. A coherent, multilateral approach to basic tax
jurisdiction issues does not seem likely in the near future.
At least as important for American tax scholars is the fact that the
U.S. rules are themselves profoundly arbitrary. As a technical matter,
the U.S. income tax system uses "source" of income to define the
boundaries of this country's assertion of primary jurisdiction to tax. 5

3. An e-mail survey of ABA-accredited U.S. law schools made under the supervision of
one of the authors disclosed that 52% of the 128 schools responding offered at least one course in
international taxation in academic year 2000-2001 or 2001-2002.
4. E.g., Taiwan and Brazil.
5. See Robert Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S.
International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 977-80 (1997); Nancy Kaufrhan,
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United States citizens, residents, and corporations are generally subject
to tax on their world-wide income, but are permitted a credit for foreign
taxes paid on their foreign source income. 6 In effect, we assert primary
jurisdiction to tax U.S. source income, but tax foreign source income of
U.S. citizens, residents, and corporations only if some other country
chooses not to do so. Nonresident U.S. citizens may be eligible to
exclude entirely the first roughly $80,000 of their foreign source earned
income; again, the availability of this exclusion may depend on whether
some other country chooses to tax that income. 7 Nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations are subject to two U.S. income taxes. The first is
the ordinary Code Section 1 or Section 11 tax on income effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business ("effectively connected income"

Common Misconceptions: The Functions and Framework of "Trade or Business Within the
United States," 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 729, 753-54 (1993); Linda Galler, An Historical
and Policy Analysis of the Title PassageRule in InternationalSales of PersonalProperty, 52 U.
PITT. L. REv. 521, 526 (1991); Robert Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coherence in Determining
Jurisdictionto Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 49 (1989).
Some maintain that the United States effectively uses a residence-based jurisdictional
test with respect to investment income. See, e.g., Alvin Warren, Income Tax Discrimination
Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REv. 131, 132-35 (2001); Reuven Avi-Yonah,
International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REv. 507, 517 (1997) [hereinafter
Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce] ("The Benefits Principle ... assigns the primary right to tax
active business income to source jurisdictions and the primary right to tax passive income to
residence jurisdictions."); Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1301, 1305 (1996) ("International consensus
allocates active business income to the jurisdiction from which it derives (the source jurisdiction)
and passive income to the jurisdiction in which the investor resides (the residence jurisdiction).";
the United States follows the consensus de facto); Alvin Warren, Alternatives for International
Corporate Tax Reform, 49 TAX L. REv. 599, 599-600 (1995). The mechanical structure of the
system, however, is source-based.
Surprisingly, this role of the sourcing rules is not always explicitly acknowledged. TheALI Income Tax Project on International Taxation noted that "source jurisdiction is considered
primary," but failed to elaborate this premise any further. AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS .OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 7
(1986). The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity 397
(May 29, 1985) [Treasury I] recognized that "the source of income rules define the circumstances
under which the United States is willing to concede primary jurisdiction to a foreign country to
tax U.S. citizens and residents on income because that income is deemed to be earned in that
foreign country." Treasury I did not, however, assert such a role for the source rules generally.
Nor is such a role acknowledged in the leading treatises and casebooks. See, e.g., JOSEPH
ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND FOREIGN
INCOME
5.1 (2d ed. 2000); BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME AND FOREIGN TAXPAYERS J
65.1.1-65.1.3 (1998);
CHARLES GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 12, 61-62 (1997); RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 12-19
(2001); MICHAEL MCINTYRE, THE INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED STATES
1-1 to 1-4 (1992); CHARLES KINGSTON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 15-23 (1998).

6.
7.

BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 5, at
I.R.C. § 911.

65.1.2; I.R.C. §§ 901, 904.
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or ECI). The second is a flat 30% tax, with many exceptions, collected
from the payor on U.S. source income other than ECI or income from
sales. 8 This second tax, of course, is explicitly restricted to U.S. source
income. Although the first is not, nonresident aliens and foreign
corporations who pay tax on ECI are, again, permitted a credit for
foreign taxes paid on their foreign source ECI. 9 In effect, therefore, the
sourcing rules define the boundaries of the United States' assertion of
primary jurisdiction to tax for both domestic and foreign taxpayers.
Unfortunately, the U.S. sourcing rules are as obscure and arbitrary
as any in the Internal Revenue Code, attracting even less scholarly
attention than other international tax issues. Dividends from the stock
of U.S. corporations, for example, are generally U.S. source, 10 but
gains from the sale of the same stock by nonresident aliens and foreign
corporations are generally not," even though both represent income
from precisely the same type of investment. Conversely, gains from the
sale of the stock of foreign corporations by U.S. citizens and residents
are U.S. source, 12 while dividends paid by those same foreign
corporations are not. 13 Gains from the sale of inventory are sourced, in
effect, where the risk of loss passes, 14 a factor largely under the control
of the parties to the sale. As one of our Symposium articles explores in
greater detail, the source of telecommunications satellite income
depends in significant part on where the papers of incorporation for the
subsidiary owning the satellite are filed. The result is an environment in
which aspects of a transaction that are relatively unimportant in any
substantive sense can determine whether income streams fall within or
beyond the boundaries of the United States' assertion of primary
jurisdiction to tax.
Many countries, said to use "territorial" systems because they tax
only income from sources within their territories, rely even more
heavily on sourcing to define the boundaries of their tax systems.
Unfortunately, there is inadequate consensus with respect to sourcing
rules. 15 Moreover, sourcing is not the only technique used to define tax
system boundaries. Value added tax (VAT) systems generally divide up
8.
9.

I.R.C. §§ 871, 881, 882.
I.R.C. § 902.

10. I.R.C. § 861(a)(2XA).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

I.R.C. § 865(a).
Id.
I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(2)(B), 862(a)(2).
I.R.C. § 865(b).
See, e.g., HUGH AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

431-58 (1997).
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the same economic pie by looking to the place of ultimate sale or
provision of goods or services-a factor far less subject to arbitrary
taxpayer manipulation. 16 Professor Avi-Yonah has suggested adoption
17
of a similar regime for the income taxation of electronic commerce.
States within the United States, facing the same problem at a
subnational level, generally use a residence-based system for
individuals' 8 and a unitary system with formulary allocation for
businesses. 1 9 Unitary taxation applies allocation formulae, typically

based on employment, sales, and property, to the whole of an
interjurisdictional tax base; 20 California experimented unsuccessfully
with such a system in the 1980s. 2 1 At least one commentator has
suggested that the United States unilaterally adopt such a system; 2 2 the

European Union, interestingly enough, is actively considering such a
system, at least with respect to its internal base. 23 An even more
radical solution would be revenue sharing, where administration is
collective and the resulting revenues are then returned to participating
jurisdictions by formula. 24

16. See ALAN SCHENK & OLIVER OLDMAN, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 31, 78, 227 (2001).
17. See generally Reuven Avi-Yonah, Electronic Conmnerce, supra note 5, at 507. For a
criticism of Avi-Yonah's proposals, see Stanley Katz, International Taxation of Electronic
Commerce: Evolution Not Revolution, 52 TAX L. REV. 655 (1997).
18. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 1 20.03,
20.04 (2001).
19. Id. at
8.03 (explaining that separate accounting is generally permitted only if
formulary allocation does not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activities in the
state). See generally id. ch. 8.
20. See generally John Warren, Income Taxes: Principles of Formulary Apportionment,
BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO No. 1150 (1995).
21. In the face of European opposition, California was forced to retreat from a pure unitary
system by adding a "water's-edge" election. See Roy Crawford & Russell Uzes, California
Franchise and CorporationIncome Taxes, BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO No. 1910, at 37-39
(2000).
22. See, e.g., Asim Bhansali, Globalizing Consolidated Taxation of United States
Multinationals,74 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1407-09 (1996).
23. TaxExPRESS (Oct. 29, 20Q1) (restricted online tax news service published by the
Federation of Tax Administrators and the Multistate Tax Commission, copy on file with the
authors).
24. Revenue sharing has been used in the United States to finance both state and local
governments. See, e.g., OFFICE OF STATE AND LOCAL FIN. (DEP'T OF THE TREASURY),
FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
viii-ix (1985); J. RICHARD ARONSON & JOHN L. HILLEY, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 48-85 (4th ed. 1986). It is perceived as solving a problem known as "vertical
fiscal imbalance," summarized by George Break as follows: "Whereas tax revenues can be most
equitably and efficiently raised by the higher levels of government, . . . the proceeds can often be
spent most effectively at the lower levels of government." GEORGE F. BREAK, FINANCING
GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 80 (1980); see also House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
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The interaction of these various boundary definitions can produce
peculiar results. Take, for example, income from sales. As we have
noted, VAT systems generally tax by place of sale. This means they tax
imports but exempt exports. The U.S. self-produced inventory sourcing
rules, by contrast, require that the portion of sales profits attributed to
production activity be sourced by place of production while permitting
the portion attributable to sales activities to be sourced by place of
passage of title-a factor largely within taxpayers' control. The effect
is that products manufactured in the United States and exported to VAT
jurisdictions are likely to be double-taxed, at least in part. The
production activities will be taxed in the United States while the entirety
will be taxed again in the VAT jurisdiction. Conversely, products
manufactured in VAT jurisdictions and exported to the United States
will be undertaxed; the exporting nation relinquishes jurisdiction
entirely while the United States only taxes a fraction of the resulting
profits. In effect, this particular interaction results in a subsidy for
VAT-to-U.S. sales and a corresponding disincentive for U.S.-to-VAT
sales.
Further complicating the problem is the inherent complexity of the
real world. Consider the following transactions:
A Dutch multinational builds a power plant in Mexico to supply
power to the Mexican and California markets. Two U.S. companies
are building the pipelines that will run through Arizona and
California and ultimately reach Mexico to supply fuel to the plant. 25
A Japanese multinational provides Hindi-language television content
to India and other Hindi-speaking locations via a satellite built by a
U.S. multinational, uplinked from a ground station in Singapore, and
physically located outside the earth's atmosphere. 26

Federal-State-Local Relations: Federal Grants in Aid, H.R. Rep. No. 2533, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 24 (1958) ("The most productive tax sources can only be reached equitably and efficiently by
the Federal Government, due to the national character of industrial organization and the threat of
interstate tax competition."). It has been used even more widely in other countries. See, e.g.,
BRIAN GALLIGAN, A FEDERAL REPUBLIC: AUSTRALIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT (RESHAPING AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTIONS) 214-38 (1995); David Perry, Financing
the Canadian Federation,1867 to 1995: Setting the Stage for Change, CANADIAN TAX PAPER
No. 102, at 117-72 (1997).
25. InterGen Signs Power PurchaseAgreement for Rosarito Power Facility, Bus. WIRE,
July 18, 2000, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, US News Combined File; see also InterGen,
La Rosita, http://www.intergen.com/rosarito.html (2001).
26. See
Sony
India
Ltd.,
Welcome
to
Sony
India
Ltd.,
http://www.sony.co.in/television.html (2001). Television viewers can access Hindi program
information at http://www.setindia.com.html. See also Sony to Develop Software in India,
INDIAN TECHONOMIST, http://dxm.org/techonomist/news/16apr96.html (Apr. 16, 1996).
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A Bermuda-based multinational (the former employer of one of this
issue's authors) offers a global network of submarine and terrestrial
fiber- optic cable to enable its customers to meet their
27
communications needs through a high-speed broadband network.
In each case, multinational participants generate income streams
from multiple jurisdictions. The parties themselves divide up those
streams by contract.
The possibly relevant taxing jurisdictions,
however, must divide up the resulting tax base pursuant to generally
applicable rules. In formulating those rules, they must deal with the
prospect, not present in a purely closed tax universe, that competing
jurisdictions may game-play against the rules, offering more favorable
tax treatment in order to obtain other advantages. Typically, the rulemaking bodies operate at a serious informational disadvantage;
taxpayers often have a substantially more complete understanding of the
way competing tax systems interact.
This Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law
Review Symposium issue is the first in what we hope will be many
symposia on international taxation. Our purpose is to provide a more
visible forum for U.S. scholars and practitioners who are willing to
tackle the difficulties of this vitally important topic. Initially, we expect
to publish more technical, less theoretical pieces. But over time, our
hope is that theoretical order may emerge out of technical chaos.
Our first attempt is representative of the technical international tax
issues that currently affect global business. Two articles focus on the
problem of tax competition. Telford and Ures provide an overview of
the approaches that developing and developed countries take when
using their tax systems to attract investment, highlighting the use of tax
holidays and targeted tax incentives by countries to attract industrial
investment. Deprez takes a more critical look at the same issue,
exploring the benefits of tax incentives to the country offering them
from an econometric perspective.
On a different note, Gisby and Keller explore the challenges faced
by the international communications industry and other related
industries in responding to regulations proposed by the Internal
Revenue Service. These regulations represent a first attempt by the IRS

27. See George A. Chidi, Jr., Global Crossing Completes World Network, NETWORK
WORLD FUSION NEWS, http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2001/0622globcross.html (June 22,
2001).
Information about Global
Crossing's business
can
be accessed at
http://www.globalcrossing.com.html.
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to prescribe particularly challenging rules-rules for the taxation of
industries whose businesses completely transcend jurisdiction. This
article illustrates many of the pitfalls of the relatively arbitrary U.S.
approach to defining the boundaries of a national tax system.
One of the most popular attractions at the Disney theme parks is
"It's a Small World." The ride culminates with a scene depicting
people from all the cultures of the world dancing and singing together in
what can best be described as a global cultural m6lange. While the
social and political benefits of this melange have yet to be achieved, it is
clear that the global business community has been operating in just such
a global village for some time.
Tax policy has yet fully to adapt to this extraordinary
development. While business is already truly global, the world's tax
regimes are still largely parochial and uncoordinated. As a result, tax
considerations routinely drive the structuring of international businesses
and transactions. The resulting dead-weight loss to the world economy
must be staggering. The task of reducing that dead-weight loss
probably represents the next major challenge to the international
We hope to participate in meeting that
economic community.
challenge.

